The major influences on Freud's thought include not only the rationality of the 18th-century Enlightenment, which laid the philosophical foundation for the modern scientific world view, but also the powerful romantic vision of 19th-century poets and painters. Central to the vision of the latter was a call for the shedding of the trappings of civilization and a return to the power and immediacy of the "natural" world. For Freud, the embodiment of the "natural" world in man is the "id," where he locates the instincts, at the core of the self; they represent "the true purpose of the individual organism's life. This consists of the satisfaction of its innate needs" (Freud, 1940, p. 148); the ego and the superego are secondary formations, social adaptations, formed on the surface of the id. For Freud, it is an understanding of the body-based instincts that makes psychoanalysis a "depth" psychology, grounded in the most central, most "primitive" wellsprings of the individual.

The commitment of many contemporary analysts to Freud's drive theory is based on the belief that only in an appreciation of drives is the deepest understanding of the individual found, underneath the more superficial, cultural, adaptive overlays. Just as society requires us to wear clothing to cover our physical nakedness, social necessities create layers of regulatory and defensive adaptations to cover our true
animal motives and nature. Waelder's (1960) homage to what he called the "imperative, majestic, power of Trieue" (p. 98) is emblematic of the elemental and elevated primacy attributed to the drives.

From this viewpoint, various relational theories including self psychology, interpersonal psychoanalysis, and some versions of object relations theories, by abandoning the theory of drives have lost the basis for an understanding of the individual in any depth. They have given up the tools for exploring true, passionate, authentic individuality, in contrast to the more superficial, shallow, interpersonal and social overlays. In fact, many European analysts see the movement away from an exclusive focus on drives in contemporary American Freudian theory, exemplified by ego psychology, as an abandonment of the individual, personal depths of human psychology. The call for a "return to Freud" and much of the contemporary loyalty to classical theory derive from the concern that the increasing emphasis on relational factors throughout recent psychoanalytic theorizing threatens to eliminate the personal, the uniquely individual, which Freud located in the body-based, sexual and aggressive impulses of the presocial id.

Where is the core of the self within a relational perspective? This is a real problem. In most relational theorizing, consistent with most contemporary infancy research as well as with contemporary linguistics, it is assumed that the self cannot exist in isolation. "That the self exists only in the social contexts in which it is anticipated," Winnicott's startling epigram reminds us, "only the mother-infant couple." The very capacity to have experiences necessarily develops in and requires an interpersonal matrix, and the organization, the patterning of all experiences is an extremely complex product of the interactions between the baby (with its temperamental sensitivities and thresholds) and the semiotic and interactive styles of the caregivers. There is no experience that is not interpersonally mediated. The meanings generated by the self are all interactive products.

But where is the center, the heart, the core of the individual in such a perspective? How can we find a place in the self where the individual qua individual might be thought to begin or reside? With the relational emphasis on attachment, interpersonal relations, identifications, and so on, how can psychoanalysis fail to become a form of cognitive or social psychology in which the individual is viewed as a product of the social environment? If there are no body-based drives to represent "nature" at the intrapsychic core of the individual, how does psychoanalysis retain its most important and precious legacy as an instrument for inquiry into the depths of personal experience? The distinction between the true self and false, between the superficial and the more deeply felt, between conformist adaptations and the more truly personal, between the authentic and the inauthentic: these distinctions are crucial to the analytic enterprise, and these distinctions seem to require that we locate the core or center of the self for use as a reference point.

There have been various attempts to deal with this problem as alternatives to retaining Freud's outmoded concept of depth as preexperiential, prelinguistic, archaic, phylogenetic residues. One strategy has been to grant primary importance to the body, its parts and processes, and particularly to infancy bodily experiences, yet without Freud's notion of "drives." Why would the body be important if not for drives? There might be lots of reasons. Schafer (whose identity as a Freudian despite his disavowal of drive theory is based largely on the importance he places on infantile sexuality and aggression) believes that infantile body parts and experiences are the cognitive paradigms for organizing all experience. Our early life is dominated by powerful and absorbing physical events—eating, urinating, defecating, arousal, quiescence—and these events and processes become the basic categories, the underlying metaphors through which all subsequent experience is patterned.

This extremely valuable approach makes possible a reinterpretation of Freudian and Kleinian concepts of instincts from cathex, into cognitive and linguistic terms, and characterizes some of the most important contemporary contributions to psychoanalytic theorizing (see Ogden, 1986, 1989). Yet it does not help solve our problem of locating the core of the self, Freud thought that body parts and processes are represented directly and invariably in experience; that the ego is first and foremost a body ego, and that "anatomy is destiny." This makes sense within the context of drive theory, because the bodily tensions drive the mental apparatus, because instinctual experiences are the sole motivational energy for the mind, and because the self as a whole is derivative of and superimposed upon the vicissitudes of body-based drives. But if we eliminate drive theory as a motivational substructure, how do we understand the meaning that body parts and experiences take on for the individual? They must derive to a significant degree from the mutually regulatory, interpersonal, linguistic, and cultural matrix into which the individual is born. In most relational approaches, in contrast to drive theory metapsychology, it makes no sense to talk about raw bodily experience, which is subsequently controlled or regulated through cultural processes. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980), who have made important recent contributions to our understanding of the metaphorical structure of language, argue:
What we call "direct physical experience" is never merely a matter of having a body of a certain sort; rather, every experience takes place within a vast background of cultural presuppositions. It can be misleading, therefore, to speak of direct physical experience as though there were some core of immediate experience which we then "interpret" in terms of our conceptual system. Cultural assumptions, values, and attitudes are not a conceptual overlay which we may or may not place upon experience as we choose. It would be more correct to say that all experience is cultural through and through, that we experience our "world" in such a way that our culture is already present in the very experience itself (p. 57).

It is also true that the individual experiences culture through their own body. In that sense, all experience is also bodily "through and through." The cultural input can sometimes be factored out, because it appears across individuals and its transmission is often visible and apparent (as in a particular cultural value system). Bodily experience only becomes known in necessarily social experience with others, and the very terms and categories through which it becomes known are shaped by linguistic and social experience.

The physical structure of the body probably provides constraints on body-based elaborations of meaning. The penis probably lends itself to a somewhat different, although overlapping, array of possible meanings and metaphors than either the clitoris or the vagina, although this is impossible to ever really determine. Within the framework of drive theory it made sense to think one could separate out the universal from the socially elaborated in bodily experience and to assign the core of the individual to the former, as if the body were directly represented in experience in some sort of pure form. Without the presumption of primary drives as the underlying motivational push, it makes no sense to think about the distillation of a pure, "natural" dimension of experience.

Another way to relocate the importance of the body within a relational framework is to argue that intense bodily happenings—like sexual arousal, orgasm, eating, defecating, perhaps rage—have a preemptive physical claim and explosive power to them that inevitably places them at the core of personal experience. This seems to be what Winnicott for example, meant by "instinctual" experience, which has very little to do with Freud's drive theory. This is a very useful approach, but once again, it does not help us with the problem of locating a core self.

Consider Winnicott's perspective, for example, where the self is derived from interactions between the baby and the mother. Instinctual experiences can facilitate and vitalize the development of the self, but they also can operate totally outside it. Winnicott (1963, p. 181) warns that the baby can be "tubbed off" by a good feed. What does that mean? The self does not develop out of instinctual experiences like feeding, but rather out of the subtle dialectic of maternal responsiveness. If feeding occurs in the context of good-enough mothering, it becomes a vehicle for growth of the self. If the mothering is inadequate, the power of the feeding experience actually detracts from self-development. The meaning of the bodily event depends on its position vis-à-vis the self.

There are people who experience sexual desire, or hunger for food, as a welcome sign of vitality. Others experience desire as a toxic impingement. Still others have no idea at all when they might be desirous of sex or of food, but decide by the clock. Finally, others never seem to experience desire or hunger at all. The location of experiences of anger or rage in relation to the self is similarly crucial; anger can vitalize, intrude upon, or deplete the self. The meaning of these bodily events, the psychological significance they contain regarding self, derives not from their inherent properties, but from the way early relational patterns have structured them vis-à-vis the self. Such physical experiences can not represent the core of the self, since they operate rather as vehicles to self-experience, in either authentic or inauthentic ways.

Another aspect of constitutional, bodily factors—temperament—has been similarly appropriated as a route to finding the core of the self. The history of psychoanalytic ideas is a history of overcorrections. In their eagerness to jettison the concept of innate drives, early relational theorists often wrote as if all babies were the same and the course of development derived purely from environmental input. Critics now correctly argue that babies are quite different from each other and that these temperamental differences have major implications for development. Those differences has been amply demonstrated empirically over the past several decades, and recent models of infant—mother interactions stress the "fit" or lack of fit between particular mothers and particular babies. Bollas (1989) has explored and extended this factor in stressing the importance of constitutionally based temperamental differences leading to particular personality style or personal "idiom" and to a sense of "destiny."

Differences in temperament, although extremely important, are nevertheless a problematic place to locate the core of the self. Temperament is not in any obvious sense motivational, and it is not represented directly in experience. The experience and meaning of temperamental differences is interpreted, often through identifications and counteridentifications. What is "high energy" in one family
is hyperactivity in another. What is "sensitivity" in one family is weakness and inadequacy in another. Temperamental factors, like bodily configurations and processes, can be used by the self to fill out and represent various self-expressions and self-declarations. But they do not in themselves lead to particular forms of self-formation outside of complex social interaction. There have been other attempts to search for a new locus of individuality, apart from the body per se, but located in very early experience. In the place previously occupied by Freud's id Kohut (1977) puts a preprogrammed "destiny"; Cautrip (1969) places a regressed, schizoid baby; Winnicott designates a creative omnipotence; and so on. Each theorist wants to divide the content of the self, to cut up the pie into socially negotiated segments and something else, which exists prior to social interaction and which can be considered the core of the self.

The latter approach is closely connected with a linear perspective on development and developmental arrests. The infant is presumed to begin life with a whole, or integral, self at least in potentiality, and that self is either facilitated by the human environment or blocked and thwarted in some fashion. If the self is blocked, the potential for authentic experience is frozen at that developmental point, and a reanimation of the true self is only possible through a regeneration of those developmental needs. One artifact of this strategy for locating the core of the self outside of and prior to the relational field is that it leads to a regressive cast in theorizing. Earlier is presumed to be somehow more primary, more personal, more "primitive," as if the core of the individual existed preverbally, even preperipherally, before the infant encountered others.

One way in which this sort of developmental approach is framed is to speak of the self of the child-to-be as existing in potentiality in the infant and intuited and reflected by the mother (Loewald, 1960; Kohut, 1977). I have no problem with this notion if it is understood that the child has many potentialities with respect to self-development and that the one intuited by the mother is regarded as also partially a reflection of the mother's own subjectivity. The father, after all, may very likely intuit a quite different child in potential. In fact, it is precisely because the mother's child is somewhat different from the father's child that conflict between different organizations of self is so universally generated. So, to speak of the core of the self as existing in potentiality is to beg the question. Either it exists in already organized fashion and unfolds in a receptive environment, a notion that I find implausible; or unorganized temperamental differences exist, organized and selected through interaction with caregivers.

This brings us straight back to the problem of locating the core of the self.

An interesting variant of this strategy has been developed recently by Slavin and Kriegman (1990), who have proposed a new paradigm for psychoanalysis derived from evolutionary biology and broad considerations concerning genetics and adaptation. They argue that the basic conflict in human experience is intergenerational—the clash in self-interest between parent and child. Because the offspring represent the survival of the parents' gene pool, the parents sacrifice individual self-interest to care for the child. Because the child exists in a prolonged period of dependence on the parent, the need to continually connect with the parents' goals and values is paramount; his own self-interested motives are rendered secondary and repressed, only to return later in life (that is, in adolescence), when primary attachments are less functionally necessary. Slavin and Kriegman suggest that Freud's concept of endogenous instinctual drives, representing peremptory, aggressively self-interested, associational interests, can be thought to refer to that aspect of the personality which shapes and maintains the self as individual versus the self as embedded in a relational matrix. "In the drives we have a mechanism that guarantees access to some types of motivation that arise from biocultural sources and are, in a sense, totally dedicated toward the promotion of our individual interests" (p. 37).

The evolutionary perspective of Slavin and Kriegman provides interesting angles on many traditional psychoanalytic issues. However, their attempt to use the classical concept of "drives" as the core of the individually-configured self does not really work in the way they claim. A close reading suggests that they alter Freud's notion of "drives" in order to make it work within their larger scheme.

Drives, and the structural model of drive-defense conflict, assumes a subsidiary role within a larger, relationally designed and configured psyche. But, to the extent that the classical agenda is read as a "narrative of conflict," it captures certain major, significant features of the relational world and the inherently "divided" way we are adapted to it (p. 47).

In my view, "drives" relocated and reset into a relationally configured psyche are no longer Freud's "drives," prewired, endogenous pressures whose meaning is represented within the mind unmediated by the semiotic, metaphoric meaning systems of the relational world. Once again, the effort to portray a part of the psyche as separate from, prior to, and sheltered from the interactive, mutually regulatory structures of the relational matrix proves problematic.
There has been considerable interest in contemporary philosophy and linguistics in the way metaphor shapes understanding and experience. Concepts as vague and insubstantial as "psyche," "mind," or "self" are impossible to grasp in precise, denotative terms. We understand and come to experience them in terms of other, generally more concrete kinds of experiences and activities (see Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Schaefer (1976) has demonstrated that in most psychoanalytic theorizing in general and especially in psychoanalytic formulations about self, the self is thought about, either explicitly or implicitly, in concretely spatial terms. This way of thinking comes directly from Freud. In both the topographical and the structural models, Freud grounds his theorizing in a clearly defined spatial metaphor: "the hypothesis we have adopted for a psychical apparatus extended into space" (1940, p. 196).

If we think about mind in terms of spatial metaphors, as if it existed in space, with structures, with topography, it makes sense to approach it as one would an onion, to try to locate its "core" or "heart," to delineate its layers, to differentiate its authentic pieces from its false, protective covering, and so on. Some of the more careful psychoanalytic theorists like Rapaport and Loewald have taken pains to point out that the concept of psychic structure refers not to something substantive but to recurring patterns of experience and behavior over time. Thus, Rapaport (1957) defines structure as a "relatively stable (having a slow rate of change), characteristic configuration that we can abstract from the behavior observed" (p. 701).

Yet in common usage, deriving from Freud's talking about the psyche as occupying spaces with structural properties, the spatial metaphor has become rehearsed as a primary and preconceived idea about the "true" or "core" self that we have considered accept, explicitly or implicitly, this spatial metaphor and try to locate the elemental from the unessential features of the self, to distinguish its essential from its insignificant features, to locate its center or foundation. We want to get underneath the adaptations that the self has made in its negotiations with others, to get at its beginnings, its true, preessential essence. This search for a core is what continues to make Freud's id and its romanticization of a pure, animal nature so compelling.

Perhaps to think of the self as existing in space is misleading. Clearly, the brain exists in space, and the phenomenological experience of the self as layered and cloistered in space is common, perhaps universal. But it seems more accurate and, I believe, more useful, to regard the self as a temporal rather than a spatial phenomenon. The self is nowhere; the self refers to the subjective organization of meanings a person creates as he or she moves through time, doing things, like having ideas and feelings, including some self-reflective ideas and feelings about oneself.

If the self moves in time rather than exists in space, it has no core; but it has many different ways of operating. Some of the ways in which I operate and express myself I consider more "authentic," more important to or representative of "me" than others. These are often difficult discriminations, but I think we are all involved in making them a good deal of the time. There are times when I feel more "myself" than others, when I feel I have presented my thoughts and feelings accurately and succinctly, when I have been comfortable enough to allow myself to reveal more of my spontaneous repertoire. At other times I feel less "myself," jumbled, unable or unwilling to make myself clear, too awkward or constrained to reveal myself in anything but a stereotyped or constricted fashion. We all operate in this range of possibilities. The extreme form of inauthenticity is deliberate lying. When I am lying, I am misrepresenting my feelings or events and am being less authentic than when I am trying to represent myself and events more accurately.

By using the terms "authentic" and "inauthentic," are we not measuring our experience against some implicit standard, some preconceived idea of what is "me"? Do these terms also imply a "core" or "true" or "real" me that exists somewhere (smuggling back the spatial metaphor)? No. One has a sense of one's experience over time. One can measure a new experience in terms of continuity or discontinuity with the past and present; a new experience can represent and express one's history and current state or deny and betray one's history and current state. Speaking of authenticity versus inauthenticity or true versus false experience frees us from the spatial metaphor in a way that speaking of a true or false self or a "core" or "real" self does not.

In speaking about authenticity and inauthenticity, the crucial difference lies not in the specific content of what I feel or do, but in the relationship between what I feel and do and the spontaneous configuration and flow of my experience at that point in time. A particular act of self-expression, a piece of self-revelation, for example, or a sexual overtone, may feel extremely authentic at one point and extremely inauthentic at another. In the first case, it feels "right," suits both the external, interpersonal context and the internal emotional context. In the second case, it feels "off," forced, contrived, out
of “sync” interpersonally, internally, or both. The degree to which an act or feeling represents the personal self depends not on its content (not on what is in it), but on its place in the context and configuration of experience as it is continually organized, disorganized, and reorganized in time.

Consider Winnicott’s (1960, 1963) depiction of the earliest feeding experiences, which he establishes as the basis for the split between true and false selves. In pathological feeding, he suggests, the infant takes its cues from impingements from the outside. The baby’s own impulses and needs are not met by the mother, and the baby learns to want what the mother gives, to become the mother’s idea of who the baby is. Authentic feeding experience, on the other hand, derives from the baby’s spontaneously arising gestures, which the good-enough mother meets and actualizes, creating what Winnicott terms the “moment of illusion.”

What is the content of these spontaneous gestures? Even in the earliest feedings, Winnicott suggests, the baby’s “readiness” to imagine a breast leads immediately to experiences in the real world out of which develops the baby’s idea of the breast, which is further matched by the mother’s responsiveness. It cannot be the content that differentiates authentic from inauthentic experience; the image of the breast in the two experiences is virtually the same. What is crucial is the point of origin of the idea at any given time, and that makes all the difference. At one moment a movement toward the breast occurs spontaneously in the baby; at another moment, it is a response to the mother’s idea of what the baby wants, a compliance with external impingement. Does the idea of the breast at a particular moment come from the baby or the mother? Does it arise spontaneously in the baby, or is it suggested or even coerced from the outside? This is the crucial issue for Winnicott, and it is a very useful starting point for thinking about the problem of authentic individuality in general.

The individual discovers himself within an interpersonal field of interactions in which he has participated long before the dawn of his own self-reflective consciousness of himself. The mind of which he himself is the producer and to which he, as an individual, is the terminal, is the result of all these have been established and continue to be established, and the individual mother’s handling of the baby become the existential medium of the baby’s world and are structured into the developing child’s personal idiom. With the gradual dawning of self-awareness, that mental content becomes more fully one’s own and can be used in various ways—it can be spontaneously expressed; it can be collaborative in interactions with others; it can be deceptively packaged, disingenuously presented; it can be compromised; it can be betrayed.

In classical psychoanalysis, the central and most important question to be asked of the individual is: what are the patterns of gratification, frustration, and sublimation that shape this person’s life? In contemporary psychoanalysis, in the work of its most visionary contributors (Winnicott, Bion, Schafer, Kohut, Lacan), the most important question to be asked has shifted to: how meaningful and authentic is a person’s experience and expression of himself? Richness in living or psychopathology are the product not of instinctual vicissitudes, but of truth or falsity with respect to one’s own experience. Why is the self so easily and commonly falsified, so routinely betrayed?

The self operates in the intricate and subtle dialectic between spontaneous vitality and self-expression on the one hand and the requirement, crucial for survival, to preserve secure and familiar connections with others, on the other. (Sullivan’s, 1953, basic motivational distinction between the need for interpersonal security and needs for satisfaction reflect this duality.) Spontaneous self-expression serves as the ground for an array of authentic experience; spontaneously in the baby, at another moment, it is a response to the mother’s idea of what the baby wants, a compliance with external impingement. Does the idea of the breast at a particular moment come from the baby or the mother? Does it arise spontaneously in the baby, or is it suggested or even coerced from the outside? This is the crucial issue for Winnicott, and it is a very useful starting point for thinking about the problem of authentic individuality in general.

The individual discovers himself within an interpersonal field of interactions in which he has participated long before the dawn of his own self-reflective consciousness of himself. The mind of which he becomes self-aware is constituted by a stream of impulses, fantasies, bodily sensations, which have been patterned through interaction and mutual regulation with caregivers. The experience and meaning of all these have been established and continue to be established, through the physical and mind-handling of significant others (Stern, 1985). In Bollas’s (1983) earlier work, he argues that there is no purely generic “holding environment”; the particularities of the individual mother’s handling of the baby become the existential medium of the baby’s world and are structured into the developing
true selves, false selves

1960, p. 148). Khan (1963), who wrote of the "privacy" of the self with such eloquence and subtlety, suggests that the "true self" is a conceptual ideal, known concretely mostly by its absence (p. 303). We are often quietly aware of when we are being false or betraying ourselves, but authenticity does not often announce itself in such a stark and unambiguous way. In fact, a lack of self-consciousness, posturing, self-arranging, self-presenting, narcissistic pulse checking is often the hallmark of a truer form of experience, in which the self is taken for granted, unhurried, and without barriers. The patient who struggles to reveal his "true" feelings or to disclose what he is "really like" may reveal a conflict- or shame-ridden aspect of experience, but this is hardly the whole story. (Farber, 1976, chapter 12, provides a wonderful account of the deceptiveness of revelatory models of insight.) Khan (1963) thus alerts us to the unsuitableness of the "true" self and chides Guntrip for having fallen prey to the seductive "danger of romantization of a pure self system" (p. 304).

Bollas (1983, p. 218) speaks of patients who seek him out looking for a "Winnicottian" analysis, envisioned as a totally regressive return for someone to become resourceful and effective might well have been "inauthentic" and some distance from where the person genuinely was at the time. Nevertheless, what is crucial now is the use of misuse to which those capacities are put. The idea that one's "core" or "true" self is located in developmentally earlier states is both overly simplistic and also very compelling, as evidenced by the mileage gained to "the child within" in much mass-market popular psychology. The claim to be helpless and the disclaiming of one's actual resources, although very understandable (it often operates as a testament to hope and an avoidance of coming to terms with irrevocably lost opportunities and experiences), nevertheless serves current purposes that are no longer simply authentic.

Consider the enormously delicate clinical problem involved in the psychoanalysis of victims of childhood abuse, sexual or otherwise. There are moments when to speak of anything else is false, inauthentic, a denial of what has taken place. Yet there are other moments when the account of the victimization is serving the purpose—not of making oneself finally known, but of creating an impact, making a claim, often turning the tables via an identification with the original abuser (Davies and Frawley, 1992). In such moments, which Ferenczi (1988), in his tragic struggle with these issues, termed the "terrorism of suffering," the content is true, but the intent is laced with falseness. Any statement about the self and one's past can serve, and inevitably does begin to serve, other purposes in the present. This is what Sartre (1953) meant by his argument that we are all continually struggling to emerge from "bad faith." Yesterday's insight becomes today's resistance; yesterday's hard-fought self-understanding becomes today's familiar and comfortable refuge.

Part of the thickness of distinguishing "true" from "false" experience is that both the distinction between internality and externality and the distinction between self and other become more complex the more closely one considers them. Winnicott's use of these distinctions for the infant vis-à-vis the breast provides an important starting point, but this is too simplified a situation when we consider adult experience. All personal motives have a long relational history. If the self is always embedded in relational contexts, either actual or internal, then all important motives have appeared and taken on life and form in the presence and through the reactions of significant others. Let us say a little girl decides she will become a physician through a mixture of motives that we could divide into two groups. Group A includes genuine interest in the workings of nature in general and bodies in particular, sexual curiosity, a concern with helping others, and counterdependent defenses against being sick herself. Group B includes a strong desire to please her parents' thwarted longings to be educated as professionals, identification with their social-class aspirations, their anxieties about their daughter's future security, and so on. Let us assume that the little girl sensed the importance of this career path to her parents from the moment they gave her her first Fisher-Price doctor set. How do we evaluate the authenticity versus inauthenticity of this choice and life course? Since the motives in group A reflect internal concerns and those in group B reflect external concerns, the obvious starting point would be to assume that the balance between truth and falseness in this choice is determined by the balance between A motives and B motives. But a closer look suggests a greater complexity. Group B motives began as external considerations. The girl likes to make her parents excited and happy by parading around with her toy stethoscope. But by the time she is applying to medical school, she has long since left home—her parents may even be dead. Externality...
now means something different. She certainly may still make the choice in order to please her parents; yet her parents are not actual people at this point but internal parents, internal objects. In making the choice to go to medical school, she feels a deep and pervasive connection with her parents, and her feelings of closeness with them perpetuate them as emotional presences in her experiences. So, these formerly external objects now operate internally.

Conversely, although group A motives seem to be purely self-generated, they cannot be wholly so. Allowing for the importance of constitutional, temperamental factors in terms of activity level, intellectual gifts, and sensibilities, we would have to assume that qualities like interest in nature, bodies, sexual curiosity, helping others, counterdependent defenses, and so on could not emerge in an interpersonal vacuum or flower in a simply mirroring, facilitating environment. They must have identificatory meanings embedded in interactions with important others, complex reverberations and resonances within various relational configurations. Group A motives, like group B motives, are complex blends of both internal and external factors.

It is not so easy therefore, to parse self from other, to neatly divide internal from external considerations. In fact, the extreme stickiness of this problem may be the reason why theories claiming to have located a center of the individual outside the relational field are so compelling.

We all have probably had the very private experience of connecting with oneself in solitude in a way that is not possible in the presence of others, the "incognito" subjective core of Winnicott (1963). And there is the experience of refining what one really feels or wants to do through a sudden realization that one has been too concerned with the opinions and reactions of others. These considerations suggest that the core or foundation of the individual self is self-centered and perhaps omnipotent and egocentric.

Yet there are also experiences of losing oneself in private ruminations, self-alienation in solitude, and a sense of refining oneself through engagement with another. There is a difference for most people between the relative hollowness of masturbation and the fullness of sex with another that probably has something to do with the perpetuation of the species. In sex with another, externality, compromise, and compliance are clearly features. If there is too much concern with externality, there is no spontaneous desire, and the experience lacks depth and passion. (Winnicott, 1968, depicts the importance of the capacity to "use" the other as a precondition for fully passionate experience.) On the other hand, if there is no sense of externality, there is no awareness of the other except as a masturbatory vehicle.

The richness of experience is generated in the subtle dialectics between internality and externality, desire and concern, destruction and separation, self and other. Human beings use each other not just for safety, protection, control, and self-regulation; we also come alive, develop capacities, and expand personal consciousness through interaction in a way that is not possible in isolation. The simple distinction between internality and externality, although a very useful starting point, is not sufficient to distinguish true from false experience. What is crucial is the extent to which interna1 and external considerations, self and other, have been balanced and reconciled.

Loewald addresses himself to this process more than any other major psychoanalytic theorist. In the context of generational conflict and fratricide Loewald (1978) defines the self as "an atonement structure" and repeatedly depicts the richest form of experience as one which overcomes the compulsive separation between self and other, inside and outside, on different levels of organization. Broomberg (1991) has similarly noted the fluidity of the relationship between internality and externality in health and their forced separation in serious forms of psychopathology:

Most people take their own subjective states of inferiority for granted, and can routinely accept the fact that there is "more to them than meets the eye" as something that joins them to the rest of mankind without intrinsic emotional isolation. They can be both in the world and separate from it as a unitary experience that blends selfhood and relatedness. Others, more developmentally fragmented, protect their subjective interiors as a lifelong task of emotional survival, while paying the price of never-ending efforts at self-validation, or desperate alienation [p. 400].

From the perspective developed here, what is central to the analytic process is precisely an overcoming of the sense of the other as an "use" of others or betraying oneself in adaptation to others. Psychoanalysis becomes a struggle to find and be oneself in the process of atonement and reconciliation in relation to others: both actual others and others as internal presences.

Let us return to our would-be medical student. Most clinicians, regardless of ideological persuasion, would be concerned with the following considerations when thinking about her career deliberations: Is this choice consistent with enough dimensions of her personality to represent and work for her in a meaningful way? Will
she use enough of herself, or does it draw her away from too much that is important to her? Is she anticipating pleasure in this work or primarily a fantasied security or fantastic solution to infantile anxieties? One could translate these considerations into different theoretic terms: Have the original motives attained sufficient secondary autonomy? Is she motivated by satisfactions or security? Are the identifications primarily superego identifications or ego identifications or are her superego and ego reconciled or at odds? Are her internal objects happy? All these questions are concerned, in one way or another, with the way in which what was formerly external has become internal, the extent to which externality and internality have become reconciled or are pulling against each other in different directions, and the degree to which past interpersonal negotiations have been metabolized into nutriment for further growth and development.

Consider other kinds of experiences that provide for some people a deep sense of authenticity: athletic activities or artistic creation. If I am just learning to play tennis, the effort will feel unnatural, inauthentic, modeling or posturing, not representative of me. "Grip the racket just so; position your feet perpendicular to the net; keep your eye on the ball; keep your weight moving toward the net; swing through the ball." In learning the game I am learning a complex discipline created through a long history by a community of others. Some people are "naturals" with respect to their athletic ability, but no one can play tennis naturally, at least not very well. The techniques are essential if you are to get where you want to go. Yet if I have played tennis for a long time, I may feel truly and deeply myself when I play. When I play well I am likely not only to feel free of any attention to technique or discipline, but also to feel free of self-consciousness altogether, playing "in the groove" or "out of my mind." The same techniques so painfully and awkwardly practiced over many years are now a part of me and make possible kinds of experiences not attainable in any other way. Tennis is a set of complex social conventions that make possible an individual, deeply subjective experience of potentially profound personal significance. Authenticity derives from the use of what has been socially negotiated to represent and express myself; inauthenticity derives from the use of what has been socially negotiated to create and manage impressions of me in others.

The use of an embedded spatial metaphor is prevalent not just in psychoanalytic literature but also in the way most people experience the self, at least part of the time. Certain areas of experience, different ones for different people, are difficult or impossible to risk exposing to others. It is as though they exist in secret, hidden recesses of being and constitute a core or center of the self. Other ways of being feel stereotyped, facile, and easily conjured; these ways of being seem to provide a protective buffer, a shell under which or within which more vulnerable, more hidden, and more authentic forms of experience can be concealed. For some people, sexual responses are impossible to express and integrate in interactions with others and have a "true" or pure quality to them, precisely because their sexuality has rarely been modulated through social interaction. For others, dissociated rage has a pure, deep quality about it, in contrast to the chronic characterological submission that may govern all other interactions (necessitating the dissociation of the rage in the first place). For others, a pure joy or spontaneous laughter remains hidden and unexpressed behind a dour demeanor or a hyperresponsive version of adulthood. For still others, certain kinds of preverbal experiences have been preserved as a refuge for the self, while language in general has been coopted by deception and self-betrayal. These experiences are sometimes organized into a sense that the thwarted spontaneity of the self as baby, is hidden behind the empty, conformistic adaptations of adulthood.

Clinical psychoanalysis, unless it becomes a sterile exercise in "rationality," operates within the phenomenology of the self. Analyst and patient enter spaces, explore recesses, traverse topographies. Previously inaccessible experiences, running the gamut from totally dissociated to concealed to conflict ridden, often make themselves known through personalized metaphors: animals, babies, explosions, elemental forces, closets, demons. These experiences can come alive in the analytic situation only on their own terms. The experience of self as a preverbal baby cannot be talked about, because it is the very corruption of language in the dynamics of particular families that initially makes it impossible for the patient to feel alive through words. The experience of the self as explosively rageful or demonically sexual cannot be translated into polite conversation, because it was precisely the disembodied and mannered forms of familial discourse that created the sense of rage and sexuality as dangerous and primitive. The metaphors around which versions of self are organized generally come in complementary pairs: the metaphor of the needy baby/the metaphor of pale and joyless adulthood; the metaphor of the beast/the metaphor of the civilized citizen; and so on. Versions of the self are states of mind accessible only on their own terms, and the collaborative struggle to discover and create these terms is a crucial dimension of the analytic process. Ironically, it is only as the analytic process enables the patient to live in what are felt
to be secret, hidden, core spaces within the self that he begins to experience these states as versions of himself, among many other versions of himself, that emerge and are shaped over time.

Thinking about self in temporal as opposed to spatial terms forces a reconsideration of the relationship between body and experience of self. I have argued elsewhere (Mitchell, 1988) that it makes more sense to think about body-based experiences like sexual desire or rage not as continual, primitive, endogenous pressures located in a place within the psyche (like the "Id"), but as reactions to stimuli, internal and external, always in particular relational contexts. From this perspective it makes no sense to say that desire and aggression are any more "primitive," basic, or fundamental than laughing or painting contrived to manage self-states and others? Is the desire, rage, laughter, or painting derivative from and expressive spontaneous reactions to both internal and external stimuli, or is the desire, rage, laughter, or painting contrived to manage self-states and others?

From this perspective, body-based experiences of self are no more primary than verbal experiences of self; rather, different ways of organizing experience are seen as coterminous and in dialectical relationship with each other. Thus, Stern (1985) suggests that what he calls different "senses" of self—emergent, core, intersubjective and verbal—are not passed through sequentially in stages, but coexist together in adult experience. Ogden (1989) similarly argues that what he terms the "autistic-contiguous" mode of experience, involving a basic kinesthetic sense of sensory continuity and embodiment, operates in a continual interplay with paranoid-schizoid and depressive modes of organizing experience. Again, it is a mistake to think of one form of experience as more basic or deeper, because they are not layered in space; rather, they shift back and forth as forms of self-organization over time.

An interesting additional facet of the relationship between the body and the experience of self concerns the issue of gender. If one assumes, as did Freud, that "anatomy is destiny" and that the drives constitute the core of the psyche, one would think of the self and of experience in general as gendered. (Of course, Freud felt that the array of component drives makes us all bisexual, so that both genders are represented in each psyche.) In contrast, if one assumes that the self is organized in different ways at different points in time, some of those organizations may be gendered (monosexual or bisexual), while others may not. It may be developmentally necessary for a little boy or a little girl to feel very much like a little boy or a little girl, but very unnecessarily and enormously constraining for any adult man or woman to need to experience themselves continually in a gendered way (Harris, 1991; Dimen, 1991). Gender identity, or a gendered identity, is, for most people, extremely important to establish. In fact, the most important function of sexual activity for many people is not the pleasure or release per se, but the establishment of the sense of oneself as a woman or as a man (see Person, 1980; Simon and Gagnon, 1973). Yet it may not be that a gendered sense of self always underlies experience. In fact, the capacity to organize experience in many ungendered (not bisexual) ways, without a compulsive need to evoke a gendered identity, might be considered a feature of mental health.

According to Lao-tsu, setting out to find the Tao (roughly speaking, Enlightenment) is like setting out in pursuit of a thief hiding in the forest by banging loudly on a drum. Setting out to find one's true self or trying to hold onto one's true self entails similar problems. The shifting fluidity of human experience through time makes authenticity essentially and necessarily ambiguous. It is the fascination with and pursuit of that ambiguity that lies at the heart of the analytic process. It is this fascination which is held in common by clinicians who love doing analytic work. It is in this sense that I do not agree with Schafer (1983) that doing analysis entails a "subordination" of the analyst's personality. Certainly there is a kind of discipline involved, but, like the discipline and technique in sports or artistic expression, the form makes possible a liberating kind of experience that is hard to come by in any other way. Doing analysis, either as a patient or as an analyst, involves a struggle to reach a fully authentic experience of a particular kind that, when fully engaged, makes possible a kind of freedom and authenticity which is both rare and precious.

What makes psychoanalysis a highly personal process is not deriving the individual mind from outside the social field, but its focus on the subjective meaning of any piece of mental life. Psychoanalytic theorizing will have more to contribute to our understanding of personal individuality if we can get away from a search for presocial or extrasocial roots of the core or true self and focus on what it means at any particular moment to be experiencing and using oneself more or less authentically.

REFERENCES

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